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Book Reviews 
Spenserian Poetics: Idolatry, Iconoc/asm, and Magic by Kenneth Gross. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985. Pp. 271. $24.95. 
"Idolatry" and "Iconoclasm" name the dialectic that informs the analysis 
in this undeniably intelligent study of Spenser; magic, "the third key word of 
this book's very un-dialectical subtitle" is "something of a surd," Gross tells 
his reader; "the term may indeed sound unusually anomalous in what I tend 
to think of as a skeptical and de-idealizing approach to Spenser" (p. 22). Not, 
of course, because magic is incapable of being produced dialectically (false/ 
true, black/white) but rather, given a text which makes just those kinds of 
distinctions difficult to maintain, magic translates into poetry, recouping with 
it (however tainted the term may be) an object of faith, an ideal. '''Magic' in 
this sense is no escape clause but an attempt to name what is most difficult, 
mysterious, and necessary in Spenser's romance" (p. 24), so Gross concludes 
his "Introduction," There are many other terms that might be used in its 
stead-"metaphor," "language," "love," or "miracle" come to Gross's mind. 
As the relationship between his dialectical terms and their surd partner 
might begin to suggest, Gross's study confronts and enacts ambivalence. At 
its best, it is aware of the numerous ways in which attachment to an image is 
both fostered and defeated in the Spenserian text, aware equally that an at-
tachment to the destruction of finality may be as fetishistic as worship of the 
idol. "To break an image is not necessarily to break away from an image" 
(p. 11) is almost the opening aphorism of this study, studded with such tell-
ing phrases; the point, indeed, is made throughout the book, nowhere more 
stunningly than in a reading of the Blatant Beast along with Freud's death in-
stinct, and as a version of the poet at his most iconoclastic, defiling his own 
signifiers. Thus, the initial chapter on The Faerie Queene compares Orgoglio 
and Arthur, troubling distinctions between iconoclasm and icon, finally by 
reading Arthur's shield as "an allegory that slays allegory" (p. 143); similarly, 
if conversely, of the Cupid worshipped in the House of Busyrane, Gross 
writes, "the blind god blinds" (p. 161) as he pursues moments in the career 
of Britomart, from the mirror stage to breaking in to Busyrane's, to her inva-
sion by the vision in Isis Church. "Idols of the Quest" is the name of the 
chapter, and subsequent ones explore the Garden of Adonis as the sale loca-
tion of the poem to escape the dialectic which Gross finds again in the final 
books, in Colin and Calidore's interrupted vision of the Graces or in Faunus' 
sight of the goddess. "Faunus is a form of the poet at his most exuberant and 
ambivalent, a figure mocked and mocking, idolatrous and iconoclastic" 
(p. 244) is almost the last word of the book: still mapping the territory of an 
ambivalent dialectic in readings of an anthology of Spenserian high-points. 
"A form of the poet": the phrase suggests the ambivalence that informs 
Gross's procedures. "The poet" is the magical talisman of Gross's text, his 
way of recouping everything that might be lost by assenting fully to the "de-
idealizing" procedures that will not allow any image more than imaginary 
status. Candidly, closing the chapter on the Garden of Adonis ("Eden \\'ith-
out Idols"), Gross admits a reader's objections: "A reader of an earlier draft 
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of this chapter tells me that so grand a Garden must do more than conceal 
questions about language and metaphor" (p. 208). like the poet he describes, 
Gross defends against this by, at one and the same time, insisting that it as a 
misreading and by insisting on his reading: "Especially given the poet's situ-
ation as a latecomer in a long tradition of mythmaking, as one who is thus 
more disenchanted even in his most extravagant idealisms, Spenser needs 
the Garden to explore ... questions about the temporal sources and burdens 
of poetry ... " (pp. 208-9). Or, at any rate, Gross needs such a Garden. The 
identification between authors is nowhere closer, save perhaps at the end of 
the chapter on Britomart's quest, where "the text somehow steals from us 
any single figure or frame of value" (p. 179), leaving its readers in a place 
where obsession goes no further than ambivalence, a place where there are 
only questions whose answers seem to have already been asked and denied 
an answer. "Such questions are not simple to ask, nor can they be answered 
here, unless they have been answered already. If they are for the moment 
sufficient in themselves, it is because they throw more radically in doubt our 
own interpretive unfoldings of doubt, our own fetishizings of ambiguity and 
ambivalence. Yet having posed these questions, I find that what I really want 
to know is whether they could be Spenser's questions as well as my own" 
(p. 180). The narcissistic text insists on its critical reproduction. 
I have been letting Gross speak for himself to allow his critical voice to ap-
pear. That the muse of this book is the Angus Fletcher of Allegory: The Theory 
of a Symbolic Mode-"Fletcher, a crucial theorist of literary ambivalence" 
(p. 158)-is no doubt apparent; that it is Harold Bloom's Fletcher is perhaps 
equally clear (from the dialectic, the defenses, the belatedness). "Such an in-
tersection of the natural and cultural can only be cured by a severe, antitheti-
cal disjunction" (p. 101), Gross writes of the dismantling of the Bower of 
Bliss; the vocabulary of the analysis could be replicated by numerous cita-
tions from his text. Thus, at many insightful moments, Gross steels himself to 
"the more strenuous dislocation of close reading" (p. 240); elsewhere he of-
fers the aphorisms, the identifications of what he refers to as his "intuitions": 
Bloomian acts in which the critic vies with the poetic text to grasp the laurels 
of sensitivity, recalling, for example, "with a slight shudder" (p. 93) that Ar-
chimago, as "a magus or idol of the arche" throws the ideal image-maker 
into question; stopping himself in order to "hover at length over the peculiar 
figurative stresses" (p. 131) in stanzas about Prince Arthur; finding such 
'strenuous' and 'severe' encounters with the text "chilling": "It is no doubt 
chilling to find that after all attempts to clear away illusion, one's type of 
transcendent revelation is an image of contagious fascination in which the 
opacities of imagination, divine vision, and idolatry are hardly separable. But 
such a discovery is liberating as well, almost a form of the sublime" (p. 143). 
As the prose might suggest, Gross yearns for adjectives he so generously 
supplies to the other critics "constellate[d]" (p. 21) in his text; if not "crucial," 
he would perhaps be pleased to find himself introduced as he introduces an 
insight of Isabel Rathborne's: "it may be true, as Isabel E. Rathborne has so 
beautifully argued ... " (p. 123). 
Gross opens his book with a pair of dialectical, antithetical chapters, one 
on "A Poetics of Idolatry," which he characterizes as liahistorical" and "spec-
ulative," and a second on A View of the Present State of Ireland, meant to 
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"delay" the approach to The Faerie Queene by insisting on "historical circum-
stances" and the" cultural climate" (p. 78). Enacting his own version of the 
"unsettling" that characterizes Spenser, Gross also performs the "magic" that 
will always recoup [Gross's] Spenser ("the poet"). The chapter on poetics, 
ranging from the Bible to Vico, Augustine to Buber, the Medusa to the Go-
lern, Calvin, Petrarch, Luther, Aquinas, Tyndale, Shakespeare, Bruno, Cer-
vantes (in an order no more apparent than the list I have just produced from 
memory), enacts Gross's quest; and his trip to Hibernia only confirms it, 
reading Spenser's treatise not as a "troubler" to his poetics (this will also be 
the lesson of Gross's Garden), but an example of "the mythopoesis of every-
day life" (p. 106)-a rewriting of Spenser and Freud that sums up in a phrase 
the project of this study. "I want to read in the Garden of Adonis the fable of 
a splendid and splendidly sublimated narcissism" (p. 200), and the desire, 
once named, it magically fulfilled. This is a reading that wants to face and 
efface its "de-idealizing" tendencies, to tum scepticism into a faith that 
can only be maintained by making life a poem and imagination the only 
locale worth habiting. Gross terms this a "Romantic" appropriation of Spen-
ser (p. 10), but it is-as the invocations of Ruskin might suggest (or the com-
parisons to Longfellow at one point, Of, indeed, even in the citations of lines 
from Romantic poetry)-late Victorian, Edwardian in its sensibility, in its 
prophetic pose. Undeniably, readers who want readings of moments from 
Spenser, unmoored from narrative in The Faerie Queene, untouched by ques-
tions of history or ideology, will find this book illuminating. Indeed, within 
such confines, this is as fine a book on Spenser as anyone has written. Read-
ing it is like being within" a box where sweets compacted lie." 
The Johns Hopkins University Jonathan Goldberg 
The Social Vision of William Blake by Michael Ferber. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 254. $29.50. 
"Are not Religion and Politics the Same Thing? Brotherhood is Religion," 
notes Blake in Jerusalem. The Social Vision of William Blake can be read as a 
gloss on these lines, which Michael Ferber claims provided the original impe-
tus for this excellent study. Ferber integrates two of his major concerns, "the 
politics of spiritual fraternity" and the concept of ideology, into a coherent 
analysis of topics not often discussed in Blake studies. Ferber avoids, as he 
says, "another restatement of all [Blake's] ideas and systematic symbolism, a 
vice that still swells so many new Blake books" (p. 116). Instead relying on 
the "greatest hits" of Blake, he finds his textual evidence in the less often dis-
cussed passages of Milton and Jerusalem. The Social Vision is filled with in-
sights about both minute particulars in Blake and their informing socio-
historical context. Ferber's historical and social emphasis, which instances the 
current "return of history" in literary criticism, is also marked by a moral 
dimension, seen in his view of Blake as "a phenomenologist of liberation" 
(p. 112). Ferber emphasizes the poet's "relevance to our own time": "Blake 
can make an essential contribution to the vision and program we need in or-
der to reconstruct the damaged societies of our world" (pp. 58, 6). 
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While careful not to reduce Blake's complexities, he suggests that Blake fits 
into the line of radical inner light Christianity on the one hand, and into the 
tradition of Marxist social critics that culminated in the Frankfurt School on 
the other. In examining the "social basis of the ideological space Blake occu-
pies," Ferber acknowledges the strength of his own predecessors (notably 
David Erdman), but urges a "rnultiplanar organizing interpretation to situate" 
Blake's minute particulars (pp. 34, 5). Ferber begins with a general overview 
of the concept of ideology and its place in literary studies. Sensitive to the 
over-extension that the term has suffered in recent discussions, he carefully 
defmes ideology as "a set of related ideas, images, and values more or less 
distorted from the 'truth./I l Without lapsing into naiVete, he prefers to retain 
a metaphysical dimension rather than adopting the totalizing view of ideol-
ogy of such thinkers as Althusser. Blake's ideology in particular comprises 
the subject of the second and longest chapter, which skillfully considers a 
wide range of topics. Ferber relates Blake to eighteenth-century political and 
social thought, to seventeenth-century Protestant dissent, and to the tradition 
of artisanal dissent. He locates in Blake a "scanning of origins and prece-
dents," what he calls "left antiquarianism," of which he claims The Social 
Vision is also an example (p. 49). This ambitious chapter also serves to intro-
duce the topics of the next six chapters: "Brotherhood," "Nature and the Fe-
male," "Liberty," "Labor," "Time, Eternity, and History," and finally 
"Blake's Apocatastasis," all of which "bring out the social and political bear-
ings" of their subjects. In the fifth chapter, "Liberty," Ferber attributes 
Blake's categories of excess to antinomianism, in the most thorough and in-
Sightful discussion on the topic to date. 
The reader skeptical of politically engaged criticism is relieved by Ferber's 
acknowledgement that ideological analysis "is not the master key to Blake," 
nor does it "exhaust the meaning or value of Blake's social and political vi-
sion." Ferber does not allow his governing theoretical premises to delimit his 
analysis; he manages instead to open up his subject in the Blakean spirit of 
expanding vision that values ambiguity, complexity and seeming contradic-
tions. Ferber views Blake's difficulty as intentionally subversive of the reign-
ing ideology ("To work hard at understanding anything having to do with 
society, morality, or religion is to prompt subversive thoughts" [po 64]), and 
as connected to the value of hard work. Ferber applauds Blake's "vision of 
redeemed labor" (p. 150): "We who are set at work on it are meant to find in 
our diligent toil and growing mastery a paradigm of what all labor ought to 
be" (p. 151). Avoiding the tendency to "view a small portion & think that 
all," Ferber confronts Blakean complexity by fashioning a heterodox metho-
dology: taking the "young Marx with [the] old, absorb[ing] Weber and 
Freud," paying attention to criticism of Marxism, while sustaining a "love of 
literature" (p. 3). Throughout Ferber refuses the "witting or unwitting con-
cealment" (p. 45) of his opening gesture of privileging the category of ideol-
ogy to mediate "between social history and literary or aesthetic meaning" 
(p. xi). Ferber's self-consciousness on this matter will be appreciated by those 
readers who have encountered the recent unfortunate attempt at a Marxist 
approach to Blake-Stewart Crehan's Blake in Context. 
Ferber shows us a Blake who is at once "socially engage and politically in-
dependent" (p. 175), a position most vividly evident in Ferber's excellent dis-
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cussian of Blake's seemingly eccentric attitude toward Locke. Ferber traces 
various English and American leftist attitudes toward Locke's politics; al-
though Blake's hostility is at least explicity directed toward Locke's episte-
mology, Blake would, as an eighteenth-century man, have seen the con-
nection between "matters of fact and matters of value" (p. 16). Blake saw the 
danger of certain ambiguities in Locke, which E. P. Thompson claims, "fall 
into two halves, one Burke, the other Paine" (p. 15). Yet Ferber's discussion 
might have been even more effective without over reliance on Staughton 
Lynd's Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism, especially since it is a work 
widely criticized among historians, including Christopher Lasch and John 
Patrick Diggins. 
Ideology critique is a successful mode of explanation in The Social Vision 
and nowhere more so than in the provocative discussion of nature in the sec-
ond and fourth chapters ("Blake's Ideology" and "Nature and the Female"). 
Ferber attempts to make sense of Blake's "scandalous contempt" for nature 
by revealing the ideological content of such an attitude, its status as a socio-
historical conceptualization of nature at work in his culture. Blake's contempt 
served to distinguish "his thinking from normal discourse lets it become con-
taminated and subverted" (p. 99). Blake, in Ferber's view, anticipates what 
the Frankfurt School called the "dialectic of Enlightenment": man's domina-
tion over nature entails his domination over himself. For Blake, such domina-
tion occurs when nature is perceived as separate from and outside of man. 
Ferber contends that Blake denies the reality of the natural world in order "to 
deny it to the epistemologies and moralities" of the "British empiricists' 
priesthood" (p. 47). And he connects the human centeredness of nature to 
Blake's own artistic labors: "What a life long concentration on producing 
things has told Blake is that man has made everything and that nothing is 
"given"; even "nature," as an external datum, is an illusory space betokening 
only the failure to express human culture" (p. 56). This is an especially 
suggestive formulation because it opens up a needed discussion about the 
connection between Blake's artistic medium and his cultural critique. Like 
William Godwin, Blake saw the danger of accepting "everything as natural 
and right that happens"; such acceptance allows nature to function "in si-
lencing further inquiry into the way things really are" (p. 96)-it "sanctifies 
the existing social order by placing it beyond human control" (p. 95). Blake, 
like Lukacs, invoked nature as "a social category" (p. 98), says Ferber, who 
might have quoted Marshall Sahlins in Culture and Practical Reason, who 
puts it in a more Blakean way: "No object, no thing, has being or movement 
in human society except by the significance men can give it." While Ferber is 
to be commended for his reading of Nature in Blake, this subject needs even 
more discussion. The importance of Blake's contempt for nature cannot be 
overemphasized; indeed, one could argue that it is the key to his epistemol-
ogy and the basis of his cultural critique. Ferber's discussion makes a good 
beginning for such a reorientation. 
Ferber reveals in Blake's rejection of nature what could be called a version 
of antifoundationalism; Blake rejects various attempts to locate a privileged 
space ("nature" would be just one example) of evaluation. But Blake himself 
privileges the Creative Imagination, in Ferber's words, an "inborn intellectual 
and spiritual power" (p. 24). Ferber convincingly explains the motivation be-
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hind Blake's objection to systems that depend on such a "space," but he is 
uncritical of Blake's own privileging of Imagination. The inconsistency of 
Blake's thought on this topic is duplicated in Ferber's own analysis-perhaps 
an instance of what Jerome McGann has called Romantic scholarship's "un-
critical absorption in Romanticism's own self-representations."It's difficult to 
imagine that Blake would have been unaware of the problem of radicalizing 
his critique to such an extent that it "begins to undermine even its own foun-
dations." Perhaps Blake was cognizant of the "paradoxical self-referentiality" 
of his critique, but chose to ignore it. Habermas, whom I've just quoted, ob-
jects to the ethical relativism of any philosophy that attempts a totalizing cri-
tique, and he offers a striking contemporary analogue to Blake's position. In 
effect, to avoid an ethical impasse (such as Habermas finds in Derrida and 
Foucault), Blake defies his own strictures and privileges the Creative Imagi-
nation. In the spirit of his anti-systematizing, Blake would have valued the 
usefulness of his move over its consistency. If this is a fair assessment of 
Blake's intention, perhaps I am only noting Ferber's tacit approval of Blake's 
move, though one would welcome more explicitness on this point. 
Ferber, though, is ready when necessary to criticize Blake. For instance, 
like many readers, Ferber finds "Blake's seeming antifeminism" troublesome; 
critics have attempted to rescue Blake, Ferber notes, by pointing out that 
"Blake's female figures are [often] symbols of mental states, male or female," 
and that he "was not exactly a male-supremacist, just the child of his time 
making use of traditional symbolism" (p. 92). It is unfortunate, however, that 
Blake wasn't more critical of that tradition. Ferber, though, warns against re-
constructing a "correct" Blake, a Blake "too sanitized to be quite the ornery 
eccentric we also know him to be" (p. 92), though some of his "malodorous 
opinions" (p. 92) become less so when considered in their socia-historical 
context. This is an important point: to lose the eccentric Blake, to explain 
away his "incorrect" opinions would be a great mistake. 
Ironically, despite his admirable and careful self-reflection, even Ferber 
domesticates Blake, but the poet's attachment to excess and difficulty bursts 
the confines of ideological analysis. Ferber's Blake, social in his striving to 
redeem humankind in the spirit of fraternity and liberty, if hesitant about 
equality, is a very real Blake, though an incomplete one. But how social is the 
Blake who applauded excess and desire, who warned against restraint and 
compromise and who, as Ferber notes, because of his isolation must have 
had a weak "sense of belonging to a habitable public space" (p. 159)? Be-
cause of what Ferber sees as Blake's insistence throughout on "absolute con-
victions about human solidarity and brotherhood" (p. 159), he won't face the 
possibility that Blake's anti-social attitudes were deliberate. To avoid accom-
modating Blake's visions of excess too neatly to a committed social position, 
one need only remember that, to him, "Improvement makes strait roads, but 
the crooked roads without Improvement, are roads of genius.' 
University of Washington Karen Sha betai 
J 
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The Industrial Reformation of English Fiction: Social Discourse and Narrative 
Form, 1832-1867 by Catherine Gallagher. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985. Pp. xv + 320. $25.00. 
Catherine Gallagher's book, while it keeps its theoretical underpinnings 
modestly in the background, is one of the finest studies of Victorian fiction to 
come out of the recent movement towards a discourse-oriented "new histori-
cism," though it does share some of the problems inherent in any attempt to 
relegate ideology (or, for that matter, material history) to a secondary role in 
the transformation of narrative structures. The central argument of the book 
is that narrative fiction underwent fundamental changes as it intersected the 
discourse of industrialism-by which Gallagher means the set of controver-
sies often referred to as the "Condition of England Debate." Gallagher char-
acterizes three basic controversies sustained by this discourse: arguments 
about free will and determinism, about the relationship between families and 
society, and about the way in which social facts are related to values. She 
claims that industrial fiction, as it sorts through these controversies, expresses 
contradictions inherent in the larger field of social discourse. Though she 
does not formulate a specific role for narrative within this discourse, never-
theless her discussions show how industrial fiction reveals the irresolvable 
tensions that shaped Victorian thinking about social change, and how appar-
ent "flaws" in the novels reflect such tensions. But perhaps the most interest-
ing and innovative idea in the book is her claim that the pressure these 
contradictory tensions exerted on the evolution of the novel induced writers 
to project an independent realm of representation, and to develop more elab-
orate modes of fonnal self-consciousness. Gallagher thus demonstrates how 
the particular way in which social questions were represented in Victorian 
fiction led directly and inexorably to modernism's preoccupation with aes-
thetic autonomy. 
Gallagher's three controversies themselves may not surprise anyone, but 
she illuminates them by emphasizing the interdependence of categories of 
Victorian social thought nonnally assumed to express discrete, or at least self-
consistent meanings: the family, Providence, free moral will. Her focus on 
discursive dynamics gives her great leverage on the structural adjustments 
and the evasions of the industrial novel, as well as many excellent opportuni-
ties to draw connections between issues formulated by Victorian prose writ-
ers and by novelists. She is impressive, for example, on the conflict that 
arises between theories of social determinism crucial to several strains of re-
formist thought and the traditional English novel's claims for moral freedom. 
She articulates the difficulties industrial fiction encounters trying to formulate 
psychological and social preconditions for moral action, and shows convinc-
ingly how the novels embody these contradictions not only in a formal con-
flict between plot and character, but in various kinds of psychological 
struggle. This enables her to place writers like Hannah Moore, Charlotte Eliz-
abeth Tonna, Harriet Martineau and others on a scale somewhere between 
Owenite (determinist) and Coleridgean (free will) positions, though Gal-
lagher always demonstrates how industrial narratives cannot achieve coher-
ence, and how they end by exposing the contradictory structure of the free 
will/determinism debate. Gallagher's readings of individual texts support 
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these general ideas in subtle and refreshing ways. She is particularly instruc-
tive about the way in which Mary Barton unravels formally, dispersing its 
theme into multiple narrative modes, and about the unraveling of the narra-
tor himself in Alton Locke, which she shows to proceed directly from King-
sley's ambivalence about causation. Gallagher is also impressive on her 
second controversy: on the pressure to associate family life and society in 
some ameliorative relationship, and the equally compelling necessity of dis-
sociating them, finally, as a precondition for defining the family as a space of 
value. While trying to reform the split between family and society in a way 
that would take advantage of the family's potential for-constructive influence, 
Gallagher argues, novelists regularly reproduced the very split they tried to 
overcome. Gallagher shows how this double bind is played out in structural 
tensions within the novels, but she is also good on the more specific hesita-
tions of individual writers. She shows, for example, in an excellent discussion 
of Hard Times, how Dickens translates social problems into familial ones, and 
finally concentrates on family reform (in the Gradgrind plot) as a preliminary 
necessity for social reform (in the Blackpool-Bounderby plot), only to remain 
suspicious about relationships in general, and to find family life so tenuous 
and fragile as to render it hopeless as a model for social transformation. 
The most interesting part of the book, though, is the section on the debate 
over facts and values. Here, Gallagher develops a persuasive analysis of the 
way that arguments about facts and values have caused theorists since Cole-
ridge to link politics with reading and writing through the question of repre-
sentation. For Victorian arguments about representation divide proponents of 
either limited political representation or universal suffrage along the same 
fault lines that they divide writers like Harriet Martineau, who practiced a 
selective realism, from writers like George Eliot, who subscribed to an accu-
mulative (or what Gallagher calls metonymic) realism, in which the signifi-
cance of all facts guarantees that value will be produced through their 
agglomeration. According to Gallagher, both positions deteriorated gradually 
over the course of the century. While some writers began to desert models in 
which representation is seen as symbolic-a theory held most prominently 
by Coleridge, but critiqued very strongly by Carlyle and others who saw 
symbolic representation betrayed by the tendency of all symbols to become 
ironic-others grew disenchanted with the inevitable mediocrity of models of 
descriptive representation that affirm the value of all social facts (or actors)-
models articulated originally by Bentham and the Utilitarians. But Gallagher 
goes on to demonstrate how an alternative conception of culture developed 
by). S. Mill and extended by Matthew Arnold and others attempts to escape 
both descriptive representation and symbolic representation by basing poli-
tics and culture on each other. Political and cultural ideals come to reverber-
ate in Culture and Anarchy-or in the later novels of George Eliot-in a way 
that makes culture and politics interdependent, indicating only each other 
within an autonomous realm of representations. Gallagher exposes this shift 
brilliantly in Felix Holt, showing how Felix himself is opposed both to reli-
gious theories of value (in Rufous Lyon) and to the claims of social condi-
tions and status (in Esther), and how he eventually represents a pure but 
empty domain of values that is explicitly displayed as unreadable and un-
worldly. In this way, the act of representation comes to be substituted for the 
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objects of representation, both in political and cultural terms. Gallagher 
shows, finally, how this is an essentially conservative gesture, how it empties 
out the social realm in order to preserve it. 
The conclusion that Gallagher attaches to this discussion may seem prema-
ture, however. For Gallagher argues that the discourse characteristic of lais-
sez-faire capitalism was abruptly "swept away" by the critique implicit in 
"Arnoldian" cultural politics, and that the discourse of industrialism became 
out-dated in conjunction with the development of the discourse of cultural 
politics. It seems more accurate and more obvious to say that the various 
problems Gallagher traces have been carried on in debates-however 
skewed-whose resemblance to Victorian social discourse is unmistakeable. 
Perhaps, if she had noted the ways in which political issues have been dis-
placed into the very fabric of nineteenth and twentieth-century subjectivity, 
she would not have emphasized this distinction between Victorian thought 
and cultural politics so heavily. It also seems imperative to say that the con-
cept of cultural politics itself opened up a tremendous gap in our ability to 
perceive the connections between literary discourse and the realm of social, 
political, and economic discourse. 
In general, by grounding history in discourse, and by leaning on some kind 
of tacit homology between social and literary discourse, Gallagher has fallen 
into the trap-familiar in many contemporary theories of history-of collaps-
ing important differences between writers, audiences, politics, economics, 
and material life into a kind of cultural totality. Her tendency to employ a 
monolithic theory of discourse surfaces throughout the book, though Gal-
lagher minimizes the damage by muting her large claims. Nevertheless, one 
might debate the neat and purely discursive chronology that Gallagher qui-
etly assigns to her three controversies: that novelists of the 1850s escaped 
from free will/determinism questions by writing instead about the contro-
versy over private/public life, and that novelists of the 1860s escaped pri-
vate/public contradictions by inventing cultural politics out of the facts/ 
values debate. A related problem is the static quality that Gallagher's book 
takes on by seeming to rest in the triumphant discovery of discursive contra-
dictions. Her argument has a predictable and repetitive cast, as it seems to 
circle around the same discursive problems and to name the same simple 
failures of resolution. More importantly, the finality of her case about contra-
dictions deprives Gallagher of ways to explain the relative effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of specific arguments about these controversies, as she tends 
instead toward an eerily anti-materialist rationale for social and cultural 
change, which lifts the dynamics of discursive social power out of the con-
trol, supposedly, of any and all interest groups. 
For all the new insight generated by Gallagher's discourse model, too, her 
book revolves finally on some surprisingly small claims about the category of 
industrial fiction itself. One of the basic and unconfronted problems in the 
book is Gallagher's assertion that the narrative irresolutions she finds are 
rooted primarily in the debate over industrialism. All of these controversies 
have long, complicated histories-as Gallagher often acknowledges, but 
without making it clear what weight we should assign to the many other 
kinds of pressure that shaped them (i.e., post-Enlightenment secularism, the 
collapse of Chartism, imperialist expansion, the invention of psychoanalysis, 
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patterns of sexual differentiation, or the material transformations brought 
about by industrialism itself). Gallagher claims instead that the pivotal con-
cerns of industrial discourse, as she articulates them, are explicitly thernatized 
in industrial fiction, and that the thematic emphasis is what characterizes the 
genre. This claim hardly seems to define the uniqueness of such fiction. Is 
industrial fiction really different from Victorian or Edwardian domestic fiction 
(or from Paradise Lost) because it thematizes the (irresolvable) question of 
free will? Is it distinct from the novels of Richardson because it thematizes 
problematic relations between family and society? One wonders if the cate-
gory of "industrial" fiction itself might be ill-conceived, or at least a regretta-
ble importation from more traditional ways of defining literary history. 
Despite its flaws, however-many of which, admittedly, should be placed 
in the context of continued methodological debate-Catherine Gallagher has 
written a work that will be essential to further study of Victorian fiction, and 
that will be much valued by anyone interested in the relationship between 
literature and society. 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor John Kucich 
Charlotte Bronti! and Sexuality by John Maynard. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1984. Pp. 262. $29.95. 
John Maynard has taken as his specific task the reconstruction of Victorian 
sexual attitudes, with a special focus upon the complete works of Charlotte 
Bronte. This is a remarkably sensible and cogent study of an author about 
whom much nonsense has been written. In this closely written book, May-
nard argues that Bronte "creates a vision of sexual experience that can rival 
that of any of her successors in the twentieth century for depth of psycholog-
ical insight and fidelity to the protean and complex nature of sexuality itself" 
(p. 6). Maynard is refreshingly free from any particular psychological inter-
pretation of the Brontes; rather, he concentrates on a full examination of the 
language of sexual desire Charlotte Bronte developed in the complete corpus 
of her writing, from her juvenilia to her masterpiece, Villette. An appendix, 
based upon modem medical interpretations, argues-not altogether convinc-
ingly-that Bronte died not from hyperemesis gravidarum (excessive sickness 
in early pregnancy) but from tuberculosis. (The appendix is consonant with 
Maynard's overall argument that Bronte accepted and enjoyed all aspects of 
sexuality). 
Maynard has little patience with those modem critics who have interpreted 
Bronte's life as a series of psychological maimings, or as a search for death 
and defeat; rather, he points to her healthy belief in the centrality of sexual 
experience in adult life. For him Bronte's literary output reflects her lifelong 
effort to delineate the complications of sexual desire. The most interesting 
part of passion for her was the period leading up to fulfillment, for it enabled 
her to explore the fluctuations of feeling, doubt and desire that impel a man 
and woman toward each other. Maynard praises, for example, Bronte's abil-
ity to render both the presence and absence of gratification in the passionate 
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relationship of Lucy Snowe and M. Paul in Villette. He finds the ending of 
this novel to be satisfactory in spite of the failure to consummate the love af-
fair, because Bronte believes that "being able to risk strong feeling may be fi-
nally the most important thing, whether the feeling itself prove fruitful or 
barren" (p. 214). 
Maynard is especially astute in his dissection of the quantities of Bronte ju-
venilia. He points out, for example, the long apprenticeship Bronte served in 
writing both by herself and in collaboration with her brother Branwell. The 
Angrian saga, starring the increasingly complex Byronic hero, Zamorna, gave 
her an opportunity to explore sexual desire unfettered by the demands of 
publication. Long before she had published Jane Eyre, with its sexually expe-
rienced hero, Bronte had fully explored a variety of sexual temptations in the 
Angrian adventures. Maynard usefully reminds us that Bronte does not pit 
desire against morality, but rather creates a variety of situations in which 
sexual attraction can be explored. 
Maynard's close analysis of each of the novels yields a number of fresh in-
sights. He notes, for example, how needy Rochester is for Jane's love: "Like 
Samson, he is capable in many ways of being trammeled, for good or bad, by 
a woman. Unlike Samson, his strength really only exists in relation to a 
woman, not to God or abstract principles" (p. 113). Perhaps Maynard's great-
est service in his chapter on Jane Eyre is his reinterpretation of the ending. 
Freudian critics have long seen the blinding and maiming of Rochester to be 
a symbolic castration by a fearful Bronte. Maynard argues that Rochester, un-
like Samson, has been shorn but not scalped, suffering a blow to his arro-
gance and dishonesty toward Jane, rather than actual impotence or the loss 
of love. Jane, in turn, he notes, returns to Rochester when she hears his call 
without a moral qualm; she approaches Thornfield without knowing whether 
he is still married, simply saying, "Who could be hurt by my once more tast-
ing the life his glance can give me?" (quoted on p. 140). Critics of Jane Eyre 
have claimed that we must always see the other characters in the novel 
through Jane's moral vision, but Maynard points out how she has misinter-
preted Rochester's sexual energy, assuming that he risks either insanity or 
profligacy when she leaves him; he falls into neither, and is therefore morally 
ready to accept Jane's love at the end of the novel. Maynard supplies a valu-
able correction to those who confuse Jane with Bronte herself. 
Maynard is especially praiseworthy for his effort to clear away the layers of 
modern psychology that have covered the Bronte corpus. His judgments of 
specific novels, including the unpublished novellas written just before The 
Professor and Jane Eyre, are always convincing. But occasionally, in his effort 
to defend Bronte, Maynard is too ready to attack "society" as the enemy of 
her explorations of sexual issues. Thus, boarding schools are invariably puni-
tive prisons for sexually curious girls. Bronte was miserable as a teacher away 
from her home; her own comments about boarding school life need to be 
evaluated accordingly. Maynard also seems a bit too ready to accept Tom 
Winnifrith's judgment that Jane Eyre was severely criticized by contemporar-
ies; Miriam Allott's work indicates that it is equally possible to prove the con-
trary. The overall picture of Victorian society that emerges, in spite of 
Maynard's sensitive interpretation of the language of Victorian sexuality, is 
that old stereotype of repression and hypocrisy. Maynard is on finner ground 
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when he analyzes the limitations of Bronte's social sensibility and her inabil-
ity, for example, to understand the urbane humor of her idol Thackeray. 
Here he is able to show the subtle relationship between an outward life of 
the severest rectitude and an imaginative life of the greatest freedom. 
This is a book of many excellences, and to be praised for its thorough rein-
terpretation of the sexual language of Bronte's fiction. If I consider it less suc-
cessful in its analysis of Victorian sexual mores, it is in part because the 
thorough-going reassessment of this area of nineteenth-century life has only 
just begun. Charlotte Bronte and Sexuality is one of the best books to appear 
in recent years on Bronte; every Victorianist will find it important reading. 
University of Michigan Martha Vicinus 
Henry James: The Writer and His Work by Tony Tanner. Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1985. Pp. x + 142. $17.50. 
The autumn of 1985 would seem to have been a time of particular com-
pression in Henry James studies. Leon Ede!'s mammoth biography reap-
peared, pared down to a mere fifth of its original bulk, apparently more 
easily handled, the Master at a fighting weight. Almost simultaneously there 
quietly emerged Tony Tanner's newest book, Henry James: The Writer and His 
Work, promising, in the author's phrase, a "brief reintroduction to Henry 
James for our times" (p. ix). This slim volume offers a chronological treat-
ment of James's work, with brief synopses of the major fictions, coupled with 
an overview of possible critical responses to those fictions, and such minimal 
biographical detail as Tanner deems salient. 
Despite its leanness, there is much here that the dedicated Jamesian will 
wonder at. One might object, first of all, to Tanner's characterizations of 
Olive Chancellor of The Bostonians as "hysterically bigoted in her commit-
ment to 'the cause' " and unremitting in her "hysterical denunciations" of all 
men (pp. 52-3)-not merely because they seem to more accurately reflect 
Vanessa Redgrave's portrayal of Olive Chancellor than Henry James's, but 
because the use of the adjective "hysterical" would seem to indicate a com-
mitment on Tanner's part, if an unconscious one, to a powerfully compromis-
ing vocabulary of the politics of sexual madness that the novel itself brings 
strongly into question. One might also object to Tanner's statement that 
James's intention in his book on Hawthorne was to "show off his own En-
glishness" (p. 37) in contrast to the provincialism of Americans, or to his con-
tention that James made "a clear distinction between the artist and the 
observer" (p. 16), either in Roderick Hudson or elsewhere. But these objec-
tions, demonstrating as they do a previously acqUired knowledge of the com-
plexities of Jamesian scholarship, are not, according to Tanner, appropriate. 
His book, he informs us in his preface, is written in such a way that "for the 
Henry James specialist it will have little or no interest" (p. ix). Instead, its in-
tended audience is the "educated reader who has read some James but is in 
no way a specialist" (p. ix). Given the realities of current James readership, 
the undergraduate student. 
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For the student, then, the II general reader" and others of the unwary turn, 
this book is a godsend. Henry James in a nutshell, cut down to a manageable 
size, without the annoying complications posed by james's plays, the textual 
revisions of the New York edition, or such embarrassments as The Outcry. Of 
course, Tanner's book is not without idiosyncrasies. His elevation of the re-
doubtably munching Mona Brigstock to a place in the triumvirate of feminine 
influence in The Spoils of Poynton is just sufficiently jarring to demand further 
thought. His reading of what can only be called james's moral vision, mani-
fested most particularly in his treatment of The Ambassadors, is generous and 
I think wise. But such instances of bothersome originality are infrequent. For 
the most part, this book is thoroughly expectable. Its major divisions-there 
are three-correspond to the three great "phases" of James's career, and reaf-
firm their identity as, respectively, the treatment of the international theme, 
the novel of social conscience, and the indefinable culmination of novelistic 
endeavor in the final, "major" phase. Even the number of words Tanner de-
votes to any particular James text would seem to have been proportionally 
limited to its relative position of importance in the accepted canon of James's 
works. It would be difficult for the undergraduate to use this book and learn 
something "wrong" about Henry James, so intent is it on telling us what is 
"right," what we know to be true. 
That this book consists largely of ratifications of accepted critical common-
places about James is particularly disquieting in that one has come to expect 
from Tony Tanner the willingness to strike off on an original course, as befits 
an avowed champion of Thomas Pynchon. But mere disappointed expecta-
tions are not nearly as serious as the problems arising from his assertion that 
this book is a re-vision of Henry James "for our times." It "may be true that 
our times are those when slimness is all, when less truly is more, including 
less complexity, less difficulty-and the reduction of the varieties of the 
Jamesian text to a few easily handled "types" (a notion that james himself 
played with cunningly) is welcome. Still, in the field of james studies, "our 
times" are those of burgeoning activity and expansion, and extensions in new 
and unexpected directions. Old standbys in the James canon are being turned 
from, in favor of a renewed interest in such "marginal" texts as The Sacred 
Fount or The Ivory Tower. More importantly, the impact of contemporary crit-
ical theories-structuralism, deconstruction, psychoanalysis-on the practice 
of reading Henry James has produced a striking variety of new approaches to 
familiar texts, approaches wherein appeals to such critical crutches as the no-
tion of "ambiguity" seem, at best, a matter of begging the question. 
Naturally, such a bewildering profusion of new possibilities carries a cer-
tain risk-that of questioning what we have for so long accepted as true. For 
those weary of such hazards, Henry James: The Writer and His Work provides 
a welcome relief. Through its pleasantly readable style, the accessibility and 
almost numbing familiarity of its ideas, this book threatens to become a stan-
dard critical reference on Henry James. 
Daemen College George Bishop 
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Wallace Stevens: A Mythology of Self by Milton J. Bates. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985. Pp. xiii + 319. $24.95. 
When Samuel French Morse's biography of Wallace Stevens appeared in 
1970, most readers were disappointed. In a pithy and tightly compressed 
style, Morse presented Stevens' life as it manifested itself in the poetry, but it 
was a far leaner cut than most readers desired. It had nothing of the juicier 
parts of Stevens' life that Peter Brazeau's 1983 oral biography dished out: 
glimpses of Stevens sinking his fingers into gooey cinnamon buns at an im-
portant meeting, dancing with the boys from the office at a stag party, break-
ing his hand on Hemingway's face in a fight at age 56, no less. This satisfied 
a hunger in Stevens aficionados to get close, not to the poet, as Morse does 
in his poetry as life, but to the man. 
Milton J. Bates's recent book, Wallace Stevens: A Mythology of Self, offers a 
middle ground between these two approaches. Sharing to some extent 
Morse's belief that the poetry evinces the life, Bates contextualizes each stage 
in Stevens' poetic development so thoroughly that he convinces his readers 
that this literary and intellectual history is also biography. Utilizing original 
research in the Stevens archives (much of it previously unpublished and scat-
tered throughout the country), he fashions a portrait of Stevens based upon 
the facts of Stevens' life-advice from his father on how to be successful, 
coursework at Harvard, marginalia, excised passages from holographs-and 
frames it with judicious judgment: "Stevens legend has perpetuated a false 
dichotomy between the businessman and the poet, one that should not sur-
vive a moment's introspection." If Bates's book can be said to fulfill Morse's 
promise, it can also be said to complement Brazeau's more earthy study. 
Concentrating on the more rarefied aspects of Stevens' life, Bates's book 
traces Stevens' intellectual development as it manifested itself in the complex 
mythology of selves that became the man. 
Underlying Bates's book is a sophisticated yet unobtrusive scholarship. 
One feels he has read every work even tangentially pertinent to his study 
and put it to good use. From Stevens' high school oratorical address, he 
gleans Stevens' ideal of the self-made man. From Stevens' reading of John 
Sparrow's Sense and Poetry, he uncovers the hidden springs of Stevens' first 
public lecture, "The Irrational Element in Poetry." Bates uses Samuel Eliot 
Morison's Three Centuries of Harvard to place Stevens in the proper setting as 
an undergraduate, and checks Public Opinion 1935-1946 to qualify Stevens' 
early liking of Mussolini. Given such an exhaustive scholarly backdrop (there 
are references to Emerson, Pater, Wilde, Whistler, Shaw, William James, San-
tayana, Mencken, The Daily Worker, and virtually all of Nietzsche), one shud-
ders to think of how many false starts and dead ends Bates must have 
encountered on his journey. 
In outlining phases in Stevens' poetic growth, Bates provides valuable 
background into the intellectual and cultural milieux that shaped various pe-
riods in American literary history. He begins with the influence of English 
aestheticism in the early part of the century (Stevens' sporting with the 
dandy in the pure poetry of Harmonium), then surveys the pull from the left 
in the Thirties (Stevens' weak defense of the ivory tower in Ow/'s Clover), 
then moves to the existentialist need to define a credible belief in the Forties 
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and Fifties (Stevens' grappling with major man and his affirmation of the su-
preme fiction). 
But Bates provides a discriminating and subtle analysis of this material to 
shed new light on Stevens. In his discussion of the Paterian influence on the 
early poems, for example, he carefully notes Stevens' complicated adaptation 
of this source. Self-conscious of the dandical pose, Stevens wears the mask of 
burgher as well as clown. By placing many of the Harmonium poems in the 
['art pour ['art tradition, with its emphasis on form over content, Bates clari-
fies many of Stevens' early works, and we can better appreciate why and 
how Stevens shocks the philistine middle-class out of their complacent val-
ues (one thinks immediately of "Disillusionment of Ten O'Clock"). But Bates 
also refracts these influences through Stevens' unique sensibility to provide a 
more sophisticated understanding: lilt is as though Stevens, having assumed 
the pose of aesthete, had suddenly caught sight of himself in a mirror; there-
after, his dismay and amusement became an integral part of the pose .... 
Further compounding the aesthetic dandy'S self-consciousness, in Stevens' 
case, was his burgherly sense of his own foppish creations." 
Bates maintains this skillful commentary throughout the book. Discussing 
the influence of Nietzsche's overman on Stevens' conception of major man, 
Bates shrewdly distinguishes between the two. First, he reads Stevens against 
himself. Although Stevens disclaims any infiuence by Nietzsche, Bates shows 
how this self-protective measure belies the facts. Like a detective on a case, 
he offers convincing evidence of Stevens' renewed interest in Nietzsche dur-
ing the Forties: references to Nietzsche in Henry Church's letters to Stevens; 
invoices for special orders of Nietzsche's works that Stevens made through 
various booksellers; and, of co.urse, allusions to Nietzsche in "the poetry. 
But if Bates successfully articulates Stevens' sense of major man as contain-
ing a Nietzschean heritage, he does not exaggerate it; he maintains his dis-
tance from the material to note that this may provide only a momentary 
pleasure or satisfaction. Thus he concludes one paragraph by calling Stevens' 
major man "the most daring and ambitious of Stevens' personae, the cyno-
sure of his mythology of self," but begins the next with: "This is not to say 
that he is the most convincing of Stevens' mythic figures. Most of us read the 
major man poems ... for the superlative poetry and not for the informing 
mythology." 
Although acknowledging the contribution of recent deconstructive criti-
cism, Bates proceeds as if the meaning of the poems can be determined, and 
in the process offers fruitful criticism of often discussed poems. One of the 
ways he succeeds is by altering the perspective. He suggests, for example, 
that though "The Emperor of Ice-Cream" ostensibly endorses "be," "it testi-
fies still more eloquently to the power of 'seem.''' Or he celebrates the 
achievement of "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction" in affirming the impor-
tance of the self over the world by reversing Coleridge: "it is the infinite I am 
seen to be a repetition of the finite I am." He shows how the difficult logic of 
"The Rock" can be unraveled if the poem is read in reverse sequence. 
Yet in suggesting how the emphasis in Stevens shifted in the last poems 
from the supreme fiction to the central imagination, Bates errs in calling the 
last poems impersonal: "much as Eliot effaced himself before the Supreme 
Being, Stevens effaced himself before supreme imagination." To many read-
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ers, Stevens' last poems, like Eliot's, disclose the achievement of a personal 
voice, which took nearly a lifetime in both poets to realize. Poems that fill 
the final section of The Rock-"Vacancy in the Park," "The Poem that Took 
the Place of a Mountain," "Long and Sluggish Lines," "A Quiet Normal 
Life," "Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour," "The Rock,"-and the 
handful of lyrics that never made it into the Collected Poems-"Reality is an 
Activity of the Most August Imagination," '·As You Leave the Room," "A 
Mythology Reflects Its Region"-are unself-consciously personal. Like Ariel 
in "The Planet on the Table," Stevens could say, 
[He] was glad he had written his poems. 
They were of a remembered time 
Or of something seen that he liked. 
It was not important that they survive. 
What mattered was that they should bear 
Some lineament or character, 
Some affluence, if only half-perceived, 
In the poverty of their words, 
Of the planet of which they were part. 
Benefiting perhaps from Brazeau's telling depiction of Stevens' unhappy 
marriage and fractured home life, Bates establishes the importance of Ste-
vens' wife to his poetry, both in the beginning as inspiring muse and later as 
transmogrified interior paramour. Robert Buttel, in his Making of Harmonium, 
has done much to reveal the influence of the "Little June Book" on Stevens' 
early published poetry. But Bates offers an enticing interpretation when he 
suggests that the later emotional estrangement became itself a source of de-
sire. Thus, Elsie becomes seminal to Stevens' poetry "both in the winning 
and in the losing." One thinks immediately of "Arrival at the Waldorf," 
"Where the wild poem is a substitute / For the woman one loves or ought to 
love," but Bates offers even more poignant autobiographical evidence. In a 
letter to Ronald Lane Latimer, Stevens enclosed the following unpublished 
poem: 
The cold wife lay with her husband after his death, 
His ashen reliquiae contained in gold 
Under her pillow, on which he had never slept. 
Bates observes: "Stevens ventured no explanation of these lines, which he 
entitled simply 'The Widow.' But he may have provided a clue to their pri-
vate meaning in the unusual word 'reliquiae,' which he used to describe 
some of his own poems in a letter written to Latimer about this time." It is 
such observations as these, and the following, which refers to the time Elsie 
spent in Reading even after their marriage, that make Bates rewarding: "If El-
sie touched the springs of romance in Stevens, she also touched his longing 
for a native land, the thing he would call 'reality' in his later work." 
When fellow-workers complained that they did not understand his poetry, 
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Stevens-who could address the sky as his "blue lady" and see an angel sur-
rounded by countrymen in a still life by Tal Coat-would remark that they 
were too literal minded. Clearly, Stevens would admire the style of Bates's 
book, fOf, in addition to an impeccable command of the language, Bates has a 
naturally metaphoric mind. Describing the young Stevens at Harvard preoc-
cupied with the dueling claims of art and life, Bates writes: "As a young dog 
worrying the old fin de siecle bones of contention, Stevens was preparing to 
sink his teeth into the sinewy matter of imagination and reality." He catego-
rizes Stevens' estranged relationship with his wife as a faulty algebraic equa-
tion, with "two variables and no constants," and concludes that in the 
relationship, "there were gremlins but no villains. [StevensJ was betrayed less 
by Elsie than by his own imagination; she was betrayed more by insecurity 
than by her spouse." Finally, in one of his most felicitous and sensitive mo-
ments, he says of Stevens' death-bed conversion to Roman Catholicism: "It 
was as though [Stevens] had stepped bodily into his own 1952 poem, 'To an 
Old Philosopher in Rome:" Such is the impress of this book that, fortu-
nately for us, one could say the same thing of Milton J. Bates's Wallace Ste-
vens: A Mythology of Self. 
Clarkson University John N. Serio 
Why Nietzsche Now? ed. Daniel O'Hara. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 441. $27.50. 
Nietzsche: Life as Literature by Alexander Nehamas. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1985. Pp. x + 261. $17.95. 
Why Nietzsche now? The most obvious answer offered by the volume of 
1981 essays from boundary 2 recently reprinted by Indiana University Press is 
that Nietzsche threatens the firm distinction between literature and philoso-
phy that contemporary literary theory also seeks to unsettle. Jacques Derrida 
and Paul de Man serve as the tutelary gods of this volume, with Nietzsche 
read either as their precursor or deconstructed along the lines their work sug-
gests. 
A reader interested in a capsule history of the last twenty-five years of 
American literary criticism could find it here by beginning with Martin Hei-
degger's quixotic attempt to prove that "what to common sense looks like 
[Nietzsche's] 'atheism: and has to look like it, is at bottom the very opposite" 
(p. 38). After Heidegger's restoration of Being's priority, the deluge. J. Hillis 
Miller's reading of "Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" succinctly intro-
duces "the impotence of both author and reader" (p. 52) within the Derri-
dean world of the text. "This dangerous incoherence is repeated by the 
reader of Nietzsche's essay. An interpretation of it can never be clear or com-
plete. The laws of forgetting and self-mutilation apply to any reader as well 
as to the author" (p. 52). Joseph Riddel ties the modernist poetics of Pound, 
Crane, and Stevens to literary theory's recent insistence that all uses of lan-
guage are figural and rhetorical from the start, while Rodolphe GaschO's es-
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sayan Ecce Homo provides an object lesson in the Post-Derridean approach 
to philosophy. For Gasche, "eternal recurrence" situates itself between the 
traditional philosophical concepts of "being" and "becoming," disrupting 
both while never serving as a concept itself, but only existing by virtue of its 
performance in the text. Our quick tour of criticism ends with Jonathan 
Arae's attack on both the traditional "aesthetes" of literary criticism and on 
Paul de Man for their neglect of "history," signalling the current resurgence 
of interest in the temporal and cultural contexts of literary texts. 
Arae's essay might lead us to conclude that deconstruction's day is over, 
and that Nietzsche the genealogist now takes center stage from the Nietzsche 
who claims there are no facts, only interpretations. But then a book like Alex-
ander Nehamas' Nietzsche: Life as Literature comes along to remind us that 
Nietzsche the anti-metaphysician still scandalizes philosophers; literary 
theory will remain unable to resist examining the rhetorical bases of other 
disciplines-with Nietzsche as a guide-if those diSciplines persist in the 
uncritical repetition of their constituting premises. To be cynical, or perhaps 
just Nietzschean, the other disciplines offer too invitingly simple targets to be 
ignored. 
Nehamas has read his Derrida and Deleuze, but has not grasped their 
point(s). His project is traditionally philosophical: the evaluation of 
Nietzsche's thought according to its logic, consistency, unity, and coherence. 
The paradigm of logic remains sacrosanct; Nehamas assumes that Nietzsche 
struggles to make his ideas logically coherent (and thus persuasive) and un-
derstands his own task as identifying where Nietzsche succeeds and where, 
regrettably, he fails. Nehamas manages (by the end of a book that is twice as 
long as it need be) to construct a Nietzsche he claims is almost perfectly con-
sistent. This Nietzsche occupies a radically individualist (or perspectivist) po-
sition. His objections to morality, religion, metaphysics, and modern science 
are not to their content, but to their "dogmatic" presentation of their view-
point as "objective truth." In place of such dogmatism, Nietzsche "say[s] that 
to create oneself is the most important goal in life" (pp. 233-34), and his 
texts should be read as his personal enactment of that self-creation. 
"Nietzsche's presentation of this character [i.e., himself] is perfectly consis-
tent with his perspectivism, which does not forbid that views be developed 
and accepted but which dictates that they always be presented as views of 
one's own" (p. 230). Meet the libertarian, tolerant Nietzsche. He approves of 
all actions so long as you have truly chosen them for yourself, and his phi-
losophy exists to persuade you to exercise such control over your life. 
The benefits of such an interpretation are obvious. All kinds of embarrass-
ing details can be dismissed. Nietzsche's lyrical paeans to cruelty, for exam-
ple, only mean that cruelty was appropriate for barbaric nobles, not that 
Nietzsche recommends cruelty to us. Nehamas offers a Nietzsche shorn of all 
content; only the form is left. In other words, Nehamas "aestheticizes" 
Nietzsche, as he quite explicitly acknowledges. And his book allows us to 
recognize the affinity between logic and aesthetics. Nehamas insists that per-
spectivism does not entail "that every view is as good as every other" 
(p. 198), His criteria for evaluating different interpretations are necessarily 
formal, and he calls them "aesthetic," but they seem traditionally logical to 
me. The similarity stems from the fact that logic and aesthetics are both self-
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enclosed systems. Hence, consistency, simplicity, elegance, etc. function to 
justify judgments of better or worse. 
Nehamsas embraces the "aesthetic" just as literary criticism, goaded by the 
new Nietzscheans, is abandoning it. He offers a Nietzsche untainted by the 
less pleasant consequences of the will to power. Aethetics and/or logic allow 
the judgment of philosophical positions and literary texts according to un-
changing and transcendent principles. But the notion of will to power sug-
gests that all philosophy, all art, and all interpretations will be generated by 
the specific desires and interests of their creator, and that the only criteria for 
discerning a "better" interpretation will be success. Neharnas' libertarian ver-
sion of Nietzsche neglects the fact that selves live in close society with one 
another; individual interpretations often aim to influence others or reflect 
others' influence on the self. Self-creation without imposition on others could 
only occur in a vacuum-and Nietzsche never imagined himself in a vac-
uum. Judgment of others' ideas and actions is neither abstract (formal) nor 
disinterested; such judgments respond to the concrete particulars of a posi-
tion and involve an acceptance of or resistance to that position's influence on 
the self. Our own interpretations aim to change not merely ourselves but oth-
ers as well, and which interpretations succeed in this aim is a matter of 
power. 
We need not take power to mean simply brute force. Nietzsche makes it 
abundantly clear that the noble's strength can not match the priest's cunning. 
Logical consistency can prove powerfully persuasive. But no criteria tran-
scend this power play, this endless and endlessly changing (hence genealogy) 
rhetorical attempt to influence others. Literary theory's acceptance of this 
Nietzschean view results, I think, in a vital shift in emphasis in the evalua-
tion of philosophical arguments. Rather than working from formal criteria as 
Nehamas and traditional philosophers do, the new rhetoricians tend to con-
sider a position's consequences and its probable motives. For example, liter-
ary theory will ask why Nehamas wants so much to prove Nietzsche is a 
respectable philosopher, and proceed to focus on the authority attaching to 
great names in the philosophical tradition and the need to incorporate within 
that tradition a figure so prominent as Nietzsche, who challenges its very in-
tegrity. 
Most striking about Nehamas' recuperative effort is the length to which he 
goes to demonstrate that Nietzsche really is not the threatening and outra-
geous figure many take him to be. But, surely, even if Nehamas successfully 
domesticates Nietzsche, he will not lay to rest the troubling ideas wrongfully 
(according to him) attributed to Nietzsche. The authoritative magic of the 
name makes him miss his target here. A far better course, it seems to me, is 
to fully accept the radical positions Nietzsche take on various issues and to 
consider whether or not, on the grounds of persuasiveness and conse-
quences, we wish to accept those positions. In the two best and most impor-
tant essays in Why Nietzsche Now? Paul Bove and Charles Altieri do just that. 
Both authors are concerned, like Nehamas, with the character Nietzsche cre-
ates in his texts. But the literary critics emphasize the enactment of an "oppo-
sitional" stance. Bove sees Nietzsche as presenting "the heroism of the 
sublime conscientious intellectual" (p. 374), a figure who quickly becomes 
"encoded" and reemerges in the work of Foucault and Said among others. 
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But Bove insists that Nietzsche avoids mere egomaniacal staging of himself 
as "the perfect man" by subordinating "seriousness, anger, [and] personal in-
terest" to "comedy" (p. 376). Only a "comic" (a better word here might be 
"ironic") relation to the western humanistic tradition can avoid the "ascetic 
nihilism" that" constantly extends its hegemony under the guise of respecta-
bility, of morality" (p. 385). Bove illustrates the dangers of a non-comic use 
of Nietzsche by arguing that Said's Oriental ism remains bound to the rules of 
the discourse it aims to oppose. 
If Bove finds Nietzsche's irony absolutely essential, Altieri claims it is self-
defeating. The ironic askesis, which aims to establish the self's independence 
from tradition and culture, must be endlessly enacted, and its repetition fi-
nally serves as a pathetic indication that the vaunted independence has not 
been achieved. The staging of alternatives, Altieri argues, must inevitably 
take place within culture, and the energy diverted to the continual perfor-
mance of the self's uniqueness would be better employed in trying "to live 
out ideals which can bear the scrutiny of self-reflective life. Ideals must be ar-
ticulated in a context of communal norms" (p. 410). 
The line between philosophy and literature dissolves when texts are read 
in relation to the issues that inform our own practice as writers. Undoubt-
edly, such readings are partial and informed by partisan polemics, but surely 
such reinterpretations of Nietzsche come closer to his notion that all dis-
course is situated in specific and "interested" contexts than Nehamas' at-
tempt to render Nietzsche's "philosophy" whole, consistent-and antiseptic. 
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